New Jersey Supreme Court Holds Future Medical Expenses Within PIP Limits Are “Collectible” and Inadmissible at Trial

On May 6, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court reached a unanimous decision in Murray v. Punina, A-51-24.  The case addressed a question that had troubled trial courts since the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 in 2019: whether a plaintiff in an automobile personal injury lawsuit can present evidence of future medical expenses when those expenses fall within the plaintiff’s personal injury protection (PIP) coverage limits.  Justice Fasciale, writing for the Court, ruled that these future medical expenses are “collectible” under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and cannot be introduced at trial against the tortfeasor.  The decision upholds the Appellate Division’s ruling and clarifies the line between New Jersey’s no-fault system and recovery from third-party torts. It also addresses a specific issue that the Court left open just sixteen months earlier in Brehme v. Irwin, 259 N.J. 505 (2025).

Factual and Procedural Background

In August 2016, plaintiff Lakita Murray was injured as a passenger in a vehicle driven by defendant Christopher Punina when it collided with a vehicle operated by defendant Anthony Marrone.  Since Punina’s vehicle was uninsured and Murray lived in a household without auto coverage, she sought PIP benefits through the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association (NJPLIGA) under the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (UCJF).  It allowed her to claim up to $250,000 in medical expenses, which had not been fully used during the trial. Murray filed a suit and served Marrone a $50,000 offer of judgment under Rule 4:58-1, which Marrone rejected.  After that, her medical expert testified via deposition that her future medical expenses, mainly for surgeries she chose not to undergo before the trial, would range from $42,000 to $160,000.  The trial court denied Marrone’s request to exclude that testimony under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.  After the trial, the jury found Punina 80% liable and Marrone 20% liable, awarding $250,000 in non-economic damages and $100,000 for future medical expenses.  It also led to a judgment against Marrone of $76,736.21, plus an additional $44,107.58 under Rule 4:58-2 because the verdict exceeded 120% of the rejected offer.  The Appellate Division partially overturned this decision, agreeing that future medical expenses were “collectible” and removing both the future medical portion of the verdict and the offer-of-judgment award.

The Statutory Framework

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, titled “Inadmissibility of evidence of losses collectible under personal injury protection coverage,” is key to the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, more commonly known as the No-Fault Act.  The law prevents the introduction of amounts collectible or paid under standard, basic, and special automobile insurance policies as evidence in civil damage claims from an automobile accident.  Its main goal is to avoid double recovery while maintaining cost control within the no-fault system.  The provision was significantly updated by L. 2019, cc. 244 and 245, which were signed by Governor Murphy in direct response to the Court’s previous ruling in Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271 (2019).  The revisions maintained the ban on evidence of amounts collectible or paid but explicitly allowed recovery from the tortfeasor for any uncompensated medical expenses not covered by the applicable PIP limits.  After 2019, plaintiffs could pursue tortfeasors for medical expenses exceeding PIP limits, regardless of the policy tier they purchased.  However, Murray raised a different question: whether expenses not yet incurred but likely to fall within the plaintiff’s remaining PIP benefits are also recoverable from the tortfeasor.

Murray Analysis

The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s initial argument that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 does not apply to PIP benefits paid through the UCJF because the statute only mentions standard, basic, and special policies.  The Court referenced Sanders v. Langemeier, 199 N.J. 366 (2009), and stated that the UCJF and No-Fault Act must be understood together.  The Court considered “personal injury protection coverage” a general term throughout the law that includes UCJF benefits.  It noted that the UCJF was designed to provide similar protection as a liability insurance policy, ensuring that allowing UCJF claimants to recover both PIP benefits and the same expenses from a tortfeasor would give them more compensation than No-Fault insureds, which goes against what the Legislature intended and decades of legal interpretation.

“Collectible” Encompasses Future Medical Expenses Within PIP Limits

Next, the Court determined that “amounts collectible or paid” under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 refers to amounts “legally due” as PIP benefits.  The 2019 amendments only allowed recovery for medical expenses that “exceed” or are “not covered by” PIP limits, which means that expenses that remain within those limits, even if not yet incurred, are still “collectible.”  The Court emphasized that medical expense benefits can be “unpaid” yet “collectible.”  Future expenses are not “paid” since they have not yet happened, but they become eligible to be paid when incurred.  In this case, the plaintiff’s future expenses were “collectible” because they would be legally due as PIP benefits when she undergoes the surgeries recommended by Dr. Perry.  The Court based its ruling on two main points: first, the law aims to prevent double recovery; and second, treating future expenses as “unpaid” and admissible could encourage plaintiffs to delay treatment until after the trial, unfairly shifting costs from the no-fault system to the defendants and undermining the legislative balance intended in the no-fault law.

Statute of Limitations Concerns Rejected

The Court also rejected NJAJ’s claim that excluding future medical evidence would force plaintiffs into fragmentary litigation due to the two-year PIP statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1.  The Court stated that the applicable statute of limitations accounts for PIP claims for future medical expenses through the well-established “future treatment exception.”  Under Zupo v. CNA Insurance Co., 193 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div.), aff’d, 98 N.J. 30 (1984), and Rahnefeld v. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford, 115 N.J. 628 (1989), if an insurer knows at the time of its last payment that future treatment will likely be needed, claims for that treatment must be filed within a reasonable time after denial.  The Court found this exception adequately safeguards plaintiffs whose treatment is expected to go beyond the trial.

Application and Holding

In its ruling, the Court determined that Murray’s anticipated future medical expenses, clearly within her unexhausted $250,000 PIP limit, were “collectible” under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and should not have been shown to the jury or included in the damages.  The Court specifically rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the expenses were “unpaid” because those debts or claims do not presently exist, pointing out that she had not yet gone through the recommended surgeries.  The future medical portion of the judgment against Marrone was wrongfully included; the total verdict fell below the 120% offer-of-judgment threshold under Rule 4:58-2. Therefore, the additional $44,107.58 fees and costs award was also removed.

The Remedy Question: Molding the Judgment Versus a New Trial

An interesting aspect of Murray is the appellate remedy.  Instead of ordering a new trial on damages, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division’s mathematical adjustment of the judgment.  It removed the $20,000 future medical component and the $44,107.58 offer-of-judgment award, while preserving the $50,000 non-economic damages award against Marrone. This method considers the future medical expense as separate from the rest of the verdict, but it raises questions alongside language in Brehme v. Irwin, 259 N.J. 505 (2025), where the same Court (also led by Justice Fasciale) noted that “a claim for future medical expenses is not separable from seeking compensation for pain and suffering.”  The reasoning in Brehme was used to dismiss a plaintiff’s appeal of a ruling that barred future medical evidence.  Murray does not directly address Brehme’s comments on non-separability, possibly because Marrone requested a modification rather than a new trial, but this issue could arise in future cases.

When future-medical testimony is wrongly admitted and may have increased the pain-and-suffering award, Brehme argues that reducing the verdict alone may be insufficient.  Whether a court accepts that argument will likely depend on the trial record.  There isn’t much independent New Jersey authority supporting a new trial in this specific context.  Torres v. Pabon, 225 N.J. 167 (2016) is sometimes referenced but offers minimal support.  In that case, the Supreme Court called for a new trial due to the cumulative effect of various errors, not just because of a single PIP-related evidentiary issue. Therefore, practitioners should consider a new trial a possible remedy only when the combined prejudice is clearly demonstrated.

Practical Takeaways for New Jersey Practitioners

• Evidentiary motions should be filed early and aggressively, including motions to remove deposition testimony from treating doctors and life-care planners, because they aim to exclude any evidence of future medical costs that are covered by the plaintiff’s available PIP limits.
• The focus is on coverage, not on payment. The key question is whether the expected expense, when incurred, will be “legally due” as a PIP benefit. I t does not matter if the expense has been billed, paid, or even provided if it falls within unexhausted PIP limits.
• Plaintiffs must resort to PIP arbitration for future treatment since the trial courtroom cannot hear evidence of covered future expenses. Plaintiffs should seek PIP arbitration before Forthright.
• Notwithstanding, evidence of future treatment remains admissible above PIP limits.
• UCJF and NJPLIGA claimants are treated equally.

Conclusion

Murray underscores the legislative bargain that underpins New Jersey’s no-fault system: plaintiffs receive prompt, fault-independent payments for medical expenses through PIP, while tortfeasors are shielded from double liability for those same costs.  By stating that future medical expenses within remaining PIP limits are “collectible” and hence inadmissible, the Court has closed a significant loophole that allowed plaintiffs, especially those who delayed treatment until after trial, to inflate verdicts and trigger fee-shifting consequences under Rule 4:58-2. Therefore, counsel must determine which medical expenses are recoverable versus non-recoverable in automobile cases, which will hinge on one main question.  At least one crucial question remains for the future: whether the molded-judgment remedy it endorsed will be valid where the trial record shows that improperly admitted future medical evidence affected the jury’s pain-and-suffering award.

The Murray decision is available here. For additional questions, please contact Robert J. Cahall, Esquire, and/or Igor Konstankevich, Esquire.

This article was prepared by McCormick & Priore, P.C. to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is in no way intended to provide legal advice or to create an attorney-client relationship. All Rights Reserved.